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Abstract
In this note we use the Shapley value to define a valuation func-
tion. A valuation function associates with every non-empty coalition
of players in a strategic game a vector of payoffs for the members of the
coalition that provides these players’ valuations of cooperating in the
coalition. The Shapley valuation function is defined using the lower-
value based method to associate coalitional games with strategic games
that was introduced in Carpente et al. (2003). We discuss axiomatic
characterizations of the Shapley valuation function.
1 Introduction
In this note we consider valuation functions. A valuation function asso-
ciates with every non-empty coalition of players in a strategic game a vector
of payoffs for the members of the coalition that provides these players’ val-
uations of cooperating in the coalition. We formulate axioms for such a
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valuation function and prove that there exists a unique valuation function
that satisfies these axioms. This valuation function is found by applying
Shapley values (cf. Shapley (1953)) to coalitional games that are obtained
by applying the lower-value based method to associate a coalitional game
with every strategic game. The lower-value based method was introduced
in Carpente et al. (2003).
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) explicitly consider the possibility
that coalitions of players cooperate in strategic games. To formalize this,
they associate with every strategic game a coalitional game in which the
worth of a coalition of players represents the worth that these players can
jointly obtain when they coordinate their actions. This worth is defined to
be the value of the mixed extension of the zero-sum game that the coali-
tion plays with the complementary coalition consisting of all other players.
Carpente et al. (2003) axiomatically characterize the method of associ-
ating a coalitional game with every strategic game that was proposed by
Von Neumann and Morgenstern. In addition, they formulate and axiomat-
ically characterize a variation of Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s method
by considering lower values of the zero-sum games between coalitions and
their complementary coalitions. They argue that the method based on lower
values rather than values is more appropriate in situations where it is not
reasonable to assume that coalitions of players can mix coordinated actions.
We introduce our framework and axioms in Section 2, in which we also
prove that the so-called Shapley valuation function, which is based on the
Carpente et al. (2003) method to associate coalitional games with strategic
games, is the unique valuation function satisfying all the axioms. We con-
clude in Section 3 by pointing out how the axioms need to be adapted to
axiomatically characterize a valuation function based on Shapley values and
the Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) method to associate coalitional
games with strategic games. In this section, we also point out how one of
the axioms, which deals with monotonicity in payoffs, can be replaced by
two other axioms that deal with monotonicity when deleting actions.
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2 A valuation function for strategic games in which
players cooperate
A strategic game g = (N, {Xi}i∈N , {ui}i∈N ) consists of a set of players N =
{1, · · · , n} and, for every player i ∈ N , a set of actions Xi available to this
player, as well as a payoff function ui :
∏
j∈N Xj → R. In this note, we
consider only finite strategic games, i.e. games with finitely many players in
which the action set Xi is finite for each player i. The class of finite strategic
games with player set N is denoted by GN .
We assume that in a strategic game g ∈ GN a coalition of players S ⊂ N
is able to coordinate and play any action profile xS ∈ XS :=
∏
i∈S Xi. We
associate with each game g ∈ GN and coalition S ⊂ N the payoffs attainable
in game g by the players in S if they decide to cooperate, independent of
which actions are played by the other players. A valuation function is a map
ϕ that associates a payoff vector ϕ(S, g) ∈ RS with every game g ∈ GN and
non-empty coalition S ⊂ N , where ϕi(S, g) provides a valuation for player i
of cooperating in coalition S in game g, for each i ∈ S.
We consider the following properties for a valuation function. Most of
these properties are inspired by analogous ones introduced in Carpente et
al. (2003).
Individual objectivity states that if a player gets the same payoff for any
possible action tuple in a game, then the valuation for this player of forming
a singleton coalition is equal to this amount.
Individual objectivity. For all g ∈ GN and all players i ∈ N , if
c ∈ R is such that ui(x) = c for all x ∈ XN , then
ϕi({i}, g) = c.
Monotonicity states that the valuation for a player of forming a singleton
coalition does not decrease if his payoff in the strategic game weakly increases
for all possible action tuples.
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Monotonicity. For all strategic games g = (N, {Xi}i∈N , {ui}i∈N )
and g′ = (N, {Xi}i∈N , {u′i}i∈N ), and player i ∈ N such that ui(x) ≥
u′i(x) for all x ∈ XN ,
ϕi({i}, g) ≥ ϕi({i}, g′).
Irrelevance of strongly dominated actions states that the valuation for
a player of forming a singleton coalition does not change if in the strategic
game he loses the ability to use an action that is weakly worse for him than
another of his actions, no matter what actions the other players choose.
To understand the relevance of this property (as well as of the next one,
irrelevance of weakly dominated threats), note that the valuation for a player
of forming a singleton coalition is interpreted as the payoff that this player
can guarantee himself independent of what actions are played by the other
players.
Irrelevance of strongly dominated actions. In a game g ∈ GN ,
an action xi ∈ Xi of player i ∈ N is strongly dominated if there exists
an action x′i ∈ Xi, x′i 6= xi, such that ui(x′i, xN\i) ≥ ui(xi, xN\i) for all
xN\i ∈ XN\i. For all g ∈ GN and i ∈ N , if action xi ∈ Xi is strongly
dominated, then ϕi({i}, g) = ϕi({i}, g′), where g′ ∈ GN is the game
obtained from g by deleting action xi.
Irrelevance of weakly dominated threats states that the valuation for a
player i of forming a singleton coalition is not affected if another player j is
prohibited from using an action whose deletion does not change player i’s
worst-case scenario.
Irrelevance of weakly dominated threats. In a game g ∈ GN , an
action xj ∈ Xj of a player j ∈ N is a weakly dominated threat to player
i ∈ N , i 6= j, if for every xN\j ∈ XN\j there exists an action x′j ∈ Xj ,
x′j 6= xj , such that ui(x′j , xN\j) ≤ ui(xj , xN\j). For all g ∈ GN and
players i, j ∈ N , i 6= j, if action xj ∈ Xj is a weakly dominated threat
to player i, then ϕi({i}, g) = ϕi({i}, g′), where g′ ∈ GN is the game
obtained from g by deleting action xj .
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We now introduce some additional notation in order to be able to for-
mulate the next property. Let g = (N, {Xi}i∈N , {ui}i∈N ) ∈ GN and S ⊂ N ,
S 6= ∅. Suppose that the members of coalition S decide to merge and
act as one player. In order to study the opportunities of S as a coali-
tion, we introduce a new player i(S) with action set Xi(S) := XS and util-
ity function ui(S) : Πj∈(N\S)∪{i(S)}Xj → R defined by ui(S)(xN\S , xi(S)) =∑
j∈S uj(xN\S , xS) for all xN\S ∈ XN\S and all xi(S) = xS ∈ XS = Xi(S).
DenoteN(S) := (N\S)∪{i(S)}. The strategic game g(S) ∈ GN(S) is defined
by g(S) = (N(S), {Xi}i∈N(S), {ui}i∈N(S)). The property merge invariance
states that the total valuation for the players in S of forming coalition S in
the game g is the same as the valuation for player i(S) of forming a single-
ton coalition in the game g(S). The interpretation of this property is that
a coalition of players cannot influence their joint valuation by merging and
acting as one player. Such a requirement seems natural as a coalition of
players who decide to cooperate is supposed to act in the best interest of
the group.
Merge invariance. For all g ∈ GN and non-empty S ⊂ N ,∑
i∈S
ϕi(S, g) = ϕi(S)({i(S)}, g(S)).
In the literature on the Shapley value and other solution concepts for
coalitional games, a principle of reciprocity between the players is often
used. We use balanced contributions, as introduced in Myerson (1980). The
principle of balanced contributions asserts that for any two players the gains
or losses that they can inflict on each other by leaving the game should be
equal. Myerson used this principle to extend the Shapley value to a setting
of coalitional games without transferable utility with conferences structures.
Our aim is to apply the principle of balanced contributions to valua-
tion functions. In this setting, rather than considering that players leave
the game, we assert that players leave the coalition of cooperating players
and consider the losses or gains that this inflicts on other players in the
cooperating coalition.
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Balanced contributions. For all g ∈ GN and non-empty S ⊂ N ,
and all i, j ∈ S,
ϕi(S, g)− ϕi(S\{j}, g) = ϕj(S, g)− ϕj(S\{i}, g).
As we pointed out above, in coalitional games the property balanced
contributions is intimately connected with the Shapley value. This is still
true in the context of valuation functions, in which we associate payoff vec-
tors with coalitions of cooperating players in strategic games. We show in
Theorem 1 below that there exists a unique valuation function that satisfies
the properties that we have stated above. This valuation function is derived
from the Shapley value in the following manner.
Take a strategic game g ∈ GN . With this game we associate the coali-
tional game (N, vg) as defined in Carpente et al. (2003). A coalitional game
is a pair (N, v) consisting of a player set N = {1, . . . , n} and a character-
istic function v : 2N → R that assigns to each coalition S ⊂ N its worth
v(S) representing the benefits that this coalition can guarantee its members
independently of what the other players (those in N\S) do (by convention,
v(∅) = 0). In the game (N, vg), the worth vg(S) of a coalition of players
S ⊂ N is the lower value of a finite two-person zero-sum game between
coalition S on the one hand and the coalition N\S on the other hand. For
any non-empty coalition S ⊂ N , S 6= N , the two-player zero-sum game gS
is defined by
gS = ({S,N \ S}, {XS , XN\S}, {uS ,−uS}),
where, for all T ⊂ N , XT =
∏
i∈T Xi and uT =
∑
i∈T ui. This game
has two players, coalitions S and N\S. The actions available to each of
these two coalitions are all the combinations of the actions available to its
members in the game g and for every possible action tuple the payoff to
coalition S is the sum of the payoffs of its members while the payoff to
coalition N\S is the opposite of this. The lower value of this game is vg(S) =
max
xS∈XS
min
xN\S∈XN\S
uS(xS , xN\S). This is the worth that the players in coalition
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S can secure for themselves by coordinating their actions even if the players
in N\S cooperate to keep the worth of coalition S as low as possible. The
worth of the grand coalitionN is simply defined as vg(N) = maxx∈XN uN (x).
The Shapley valuation function φV assigns to each strategic game g ∈ GN
and non-empty coalition S ⊂ N the Shapley value φ(S, vg) of the coalitional
game (S, vg) associated with g and S, which is defined by
φi(S, vg) =
∑
T⊂S,i∈T
(|T | − 1)! (|S| − |T |)!
|S|!
(
vg(T )− vg(T\{i})
)
for all i ∈ S.
Theorem 1 The Shapley valuation function φV is the unique valuation
function satisfying individual objectivity, monotonicity, irrelevance of strongly
dominated actions, irrelevance of weakly dominated threats, merge invari-
ance, and balanced contributions.
Proof. Existence. The proof that φV satisfies the five properties indi-
vidual objectivity, monotonicity, irrelevance of strongly dominated actions,
irrelevance of weakly dominated threats, and merge invariance, uses the re-
sults in Carpente et al. (2003). In that paper it is proved that the lower
value method, which associates with each strategic game g ∈ GN the coali-
tional game (N, vg), is the unique method of associating a coalitional game
with each strategic game that satisfies the appropriate equivalents of these
five properties.
To check that φV satisfies individual objectivity, let g ∈ GN , i ∈ N ,
and c ∈ R be such that ui(x) = c for all x ∈ XN . Then (φV )i({i}, g) =
φi({i}, vg) = vg({i}) = c, where the first equality simply uses the definition
of the Shapley valuation function, the second one follows from efficiency of
the Shapley value, and the third one follows from individual objectivity of
the lower value method.
To check that φV satisfies monotonicity, let g = (N, {Xi}i∈N , {ui}i∈N ) ∈
GN , g′ = (N, {Xi}i∈N , {u′i}i∈N ) ∈ GN , and i ∈ N be such that ui(x) ≥ u′i(x)
for all x ∈ XN . Then (φV )i({i}, g) = φi({i}, vg) = vg({i}) ≥ vg′({i}) =
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φi({i}, vg′) = (φV )i({i}, g′), where the inequality follows from monotonicity
of the lower value method.
To check that φV satisfies irrelevance of strongly dominated actions, we
use that the equivalent of this property for the lower value method implies
that vg({i}) = vg′({i}) for any two strategic games g, g′ ∈ GN where the
game g′ is the game obtained from g by deleting a strongly dominated action
xi ∈ Xi of player i ∈ N . Irrelevance of weakly dominated threats of φV
follows in a similar manner from the equivalent property for the lower value
method.
To check that φV satisfies merge invariance, let g ∈ GN and S ⊂ N ,
S 6= ∅. Then ∑i∈S(φV )i(S, g) = ∑i∈S φi(S, vg) = vg(S) = vg(S)(i(S)) =
φi(S)({i(S)}, vg(S)) = (φV )i(S)({i(S)}, g(S)), where the second and fourth
equalities use efficiency of the Shapley value and the third one follows from
merge invariance of the lower value method.
To check that φV satisfies balanced contributions, let g ∈ GN , S ⊂ N , and
i, j ∈ S. Then (φV )i(S, g) − (φV )i(S\{j}, g) = φi(S, vg) − φi(S\{j}, vg) =
φj(S, vg)− φj(S\{i}, vg) = (φV )j(S, g)− (φV )j(S\{i}, g), where the second
equality follows from balanced contributions of the Shapley value for the
coalitional game (S, vg) and players i, j ∈ S.
Uniqueness. Let ϕ be a valuation function that satisfies the six properties
in the statement of the theorem. We start by proving that
∑
i∈S ϕi(S, g) =
vg(S) for all S ⊂ N . To do so, we consider the function Φ that asso-
ciates with every strategic game g ∈ GN a coalitional game (N,Φ(g)) de-
fined by Φ(g)(S) =
∑
i∈S ϕi(S, g) for all S ⊂ N . Then individual objectiv-
ity, monotonicity, irrelevance of strongly dominated actions, irrelevance of
weakly dominated threats and merge invariance of ϕ imply that Φ satisfies
the appropriate equivalents of these five properties for methods of associ-
ating a coalitional game with each strategic game. Carpente et al. (2003)
proved that the lower value method, which associates with each strategic
game g ∈ GN the coalitional game (N, vg), is the unique method of asso-
ciating a coalitional game with each strategic game that satisfies these five
properties. Hence, we know Φ(g)(S) = vg(S) for all g ∈ GNand for all
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S ⊂ N , which of course proves that ∑i∈S ϕi(S, g) = vg(S) for all g ∈ GN
and for all S ⊂ N .
Suppose that ϕ1 and ϕ2 are two valuation functions satisfying the six
properties in the statement of the theorem. Let g ∈ GN . We prove that
ϕ1(S, g) = ϕ2(S, g) for all S ⊂ N by induction to the size of S.
If S = {i}, then ϕ1i (S, g) =
∑
j∈S ϕ
1
j (S, g) = vg(S) =
∑
j∈S ϕ
2
j (S, g) =
ϕ2i (S, g). Now, suppose we have proved that ϕ
1(S, g) = ϕ2(S, g) for all S ⊂
N with |S| ≤ t, where 1 ≤ t < n. Let S ⊂ N with |S| = t+1. Using balanced
contributions of ϕl, l = 1, 2, we derive that for all i, j ∈ S, i 6= j, ϕ1j (S, g)−
ϕ1i (S, g) = ϕ
1
j (S\{i}, g) − ϕ1i (S\{j}, g) = ϕ2j (S\{i}, g) − ϕ2i (S\{j}, g) =
ϕ2j (S, g)−ϕ2i (S, g), where the second equality uses the induction hypothesis.
Together with vg(S) =
∑
i∈S ϕ
1
i (S, g) =
∑
i∈S ϕ
2
i (S, g), this implies that
ϕ1i (S, g) = ϕ
2
i (S, g) for all i ∈ S. This finishes the proof of the theorem. •
3 Concluding remarks
In Section 2 we defined and axiomatically characterized the Shapley valu-
ation function, which associates with each strategic game and cooperating
coalition of players a payoff vector that provides a valuation for each of the
members of the coalition. The Shapley valuation function is defined us-
ing the lower-value based method to associate a coalitional game with each
strategic game that was introduced in Carpente et al. (2003). As argued
in that paper, the use of the lower value is appropriate in settings in which
mixing coordinated actions is not possible or reasonable. In situations where
the use of such strategies is possible, however, the value based method intro-
duced in Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) can be used to construct
a valuation function φV by considering Shapley values of coalitional games
(S, vg) that are defined using this value based method. Given a strategic
game g ∈ GN , this method defines the worth vg(S) of a coalition of play-
ers S ⊂ N as the value of the mixed extension of the two-person zero-sum
game gS between coalitions S and N\S. The axiomatic characterization
of this method in Carpente et al. (2003) can be used to find an axiomatic
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characterization of the valuation function φV . In addition to some of the
properties that we have already encountered, this axiomatization uses the
following two properties.
Irrelevance of dominated actions. In a game g ∈ GN , an ac-
tion xi ∈ Xi of player i ∈ N is dominated if there exists a convex
combination y of the other actions of player i, with the property that
ui(y, xN\i) ≥ ui(xi, xN\i) for all xN\i ∈ XN\i.1 For all g ∈ GN and
i ∈ N , if action xi ∈ Xi is dominated, then ϕi({i}, g) = ϕi({i}, g′),
where g′ ∈ GN is the game obtained from g by deleting action xi.
Irrelevance of dominated threats. In a game g ∈ GN , an action
xj ∈ Xj of a player j ∈ N is a dominated threat to player i ∈ N , i 6= j,
if there exists a convex combination y of the other actions of player j
with the property that ui(y, xN\j) ≤ ui(xj , xN\j) for all xN\j ∈ XN\j .
For all g ∈ GN and players i, j ∈ N , i 6= j, if action xj ∈ Xj is
a dominated threat to player i, then ϕi({i}, g) = ϕi({i}, g′), where
g′ ∈ GN is the game obtained from g by deleting action xj .
Irrelevance of dominated actions states that the valuation for a player of
forming a singleton coalition does not change if in the strategic game he loses
the ability to use an action that is weakly worse for him than a mix of his
other actions, no matter what actions the other players choose. Note that
irrelevance of dominated actions is a stronger property than irrelevance of
strongly dominated actions. Irrelevance of dominated threats has a similar
interpretation to irrelevance of weakly dominated threats but is weaker than
that property as every threat that is dominated is also weakly dominated.
Theorem 2 The valuation function φV is the unique valuation function
satisfying individual objectivity, monotonicity, irrelevance of dominated ac-
tions, irrelevance of dominated threats, merge invariance, and balanced con-
tributions.
1ui(y, xN\i) :=
∑
xˆi∈Xi y(xˆi)ui(xˆi, xN\i), where y =
∑
xˆi∈Xi y(xˆi)xˆi. Note that
y(xi) = 0, y(xˆi) ≥ 0, for all xˆi ∈ Xi, and ∑xˆi∈Xi y(xˆi) = 1. Observe that y is sim-
ply a mixed strategy of player i.
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Theorem 2 can be proved in a manner similar to the proof of Theorem 1
by using Carpente et al.’s axiomatic characterization of Von Neumann and
Morgenstern’s value based method.
We conclude this note by pointing out that in the axiomatic characteri-
zations in Theorems 1 and 2 monotonicity can be replaced by two properties
called elimination of own actions and elimination of others’ actions. These
two properties are inspired by the properties irrelevance of (strongly) domi-
nated actions and irrelevance of (weakly) dominated threats and address the
elimination of arbitrary actions, dominated or not. Elimination of own ac-
tions states that the elimination of an (arbitrary) action of player i does not
increase this player’s valuation of forming a singleton coalition, and elimi-
nation of others’ actions states that the valuation for a player i of forming a
singleton coalition does not decrease when an (arbitrary) action of another
player j is eliminated. Hence, these properties highlight a form of mono-
tonicity with respect to the elimination of actions. It is shown in Carpente
et al. (2003) that these properties can replace monotonicity in the axiomatic
characterizations of both the value based and the lower-value based methods
to associate a coalitional game with each strategic game and this result can
be adapted to the valuation function setting of this note. These properties
have also been used in Norde and Voorneveld (2003) to characterize the
value of the mixed extension of a matrix game.
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